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1 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, German Branch

SUBJECT : CARAVEL's Comments on the Admiral Luedke
Affair

1. At my meeting with CARAVEL on 29 October 1968, he had no additional information regarding the Luedke affair and commented that he felt that I was probably better informed on this than himself. He used this occasion to make some comments on the overall German security system and atmosphere in the Federal Republic.

2. CARAVEL felt the Luedke affair had been completely mishandled, but he blamed this more upon the bureaucratic structure in Germany than upon the professional competence of the officers involved -- what can you expect, CARAVEL commented, when you have three or four different investigative services operating under the jurisdiction of at least two different ministries. Each of these services jealously guards its bureaucratic competence and regards interest by another German service as an infringement upon its competence. In many cases the services are more interested in protecting their own vested interests than in protecting the German Government against subversion. According to CARAVEL, there is no formal or informal coordination among the various German intelligence and security services. He claimed that he has virtually no contact with the chiefs of the other services. For example, he said he sees the CAVATA chief only occasionally at cocktail parties or when they both appear in the Bundestag to testify before the Budget Committee. So far he has not met [] and has never seen UTILITY. He also has only occasional social contact with the chief of the CAHESSITE services. He believes that there should be regular meetings of the security services chiefs to coordinate the policies and activities of these services. He is of the firm opinion that a strong central authority must be set up on the national level to coordinate the security policies and activities.

3. He indirectly holds the Allies responsible for the present state of ineffectiveness of the German investigative services. In his view, the tremendous emphasis upon democratizing Germany after World War II and decentralizing the police forces

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resulted in the present ineffective system. He is particularly critical of the Allied insistence upon a separation of the investigative and executive functions of the security services. He recognizes the reasons for the Allied action in this field but feels it was a mistake. He does not believe that a decentralized police and security system can function effectively.

4. CARAVEL was also highly critical of the present state of security consciousness among the Government officials in Bonn. He said that senior Government officials become extremely indignant and upset when they are reminded that they should not take secret files home with them. In several instances they have written indignant letters to various senior officials, including himself, to complain about the nosy security officials and consider the security regulations as a violation of their own personal freedom. These same individuals, however, are the first to complain and demand action when something such as the Luedke affair occurs. CARAVEL was extremely pessimistic about changing this situation. In fact, he believes it is now impossible to bring about an effective change in the attitude of these officials. Again, he holds the Allies partly responsible for the security attitude of the present German bureaucracy since the Allies emphasized personal freedom at the expense of security after the war.

5. If CARAVEL is invited to participate in the forthcoming high level security discussion in Bonn, he claimed he would do so only if these discussions turn out to be meaningful. If, as he suspects, the individuals involved only engage in a polite exchange of views, CARAVEL said he would withdraw and send a subordinate to participate in future meetings. He said he is much too busy to become involved in polite and meaningless meetings. If he participates in the Bonn discussions on security services, he is going to push for some form of centralized coordination of the activities of the various intelligence and security services. Also, if he participates he will keep us informed.

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